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Lemma 2. If vg ∈ [(1/14)v(2)g′ , (2/7)v(2)g′ ], then there exists a fully revealing ex ante
equilibrium such that voter vg′ demands two votes, v(2)g′ randomizes between demanding one
vote and offering his vote for sale (with probability σv(2)g′ ),vg randomizes between demanding
two votes and selling his vote (with probability σvg), and all other voters offer to sell their
vote. The randomization probabilities and the equilibrium price are solutions to the system:
3 = 2σv(2)g′ + 3σvg
p = v(2)g′
(
1− σvg
6 + 3σvg
)
p = vg
(
2 + σv(2)g′
10− σv(2)g′
)
Proof of Lemma 2.We need to distinguish the two possible cases: g′ = m, and g′ = M .
(1) If g′ = m, each voter’s preferred alternative is known, and each expects the others to
follow the strategies described in the lemma, the expected utilities of different actions are
given by:
EUvmD2 = σvMσv(2)m(vm − 2p) + σvM (1− σv(2)m)(vm − 2p)+
+ (1− σvM )σv(2)m(vm/2− p) + 2(1− σvM )(1− σv(2)m)(vm − p)/3
EUvmD1 = σvMσv(2)m(3vm/4− p) + σvM (1− σv(2)m)(vm − p)+
+ (1− σvM )σv(2)m(−p) + 2(1− σvM )(1− σv(2)m)(vm − p)/3
EUvm0 = (1− σv(2)m)σvMvm + (1− σvM )(1− σv(2)m)vm/2
EUvmS = (1− σv(2)m)σvM (3vm/4 + p/4) + (1− σvM )σv(2)mp/2
+ (1− σvM )(1− σv(2)m)p
EUv(2)mD2 = σvM (v(2)m − p) + 2(1− σvM )(v(2)m − p)/3
EUv(2)mD1 = σvM (v(2)m − p) + 2(1− σvM )(v(2)m − p/2)/3
EUv(2)m0 = σvMv(2)m + (1− σvM )v(2)m/2
EUv(2)mS = σvM (v(2)m + p/2) + (1− σ
Proofs: Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 
vM )(v(2)m/2 + 2p/3) (S2a)
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EUvMD2 = σv(2)m(vM/2− p) + (1− σv(2)m)(vM/3− 2p/3)
EUvMD1 = σv(2)m(−p) + (1− σv(2)m)(−2p/3)
EUvM0 = 0
EUvMS = σv(2)mp/2 + (1− σv(2)m)p
EUviMD2 = σvMσv(2)m(viM/2− p) + σvM (1− σv(2)m)(viM − 2p)/3+
+ (1− σvM )2σv(2)m(viM − p)/3
EUviMD1 = σvMσv(2)m(−p) + σvM (1− σv(2)m)(−2p/3)+
+ (1− σvM )σv(2)m(2viM − p)/3 + (1− σvM )(1− σv(2)m)(viM − p)/2
EUviM0 = (1− σvM )σv(2)mviM/2
EUviMS = σvMσv(2)mp/2 + σvM (1− σv(2)m)p+ (1− σvM )σv(2)m(viM/2 + 2p/3)+
+ (1− σvM )(1− σv(2)m)(viM/3 + 5p/6)
with viM ≤ vM < v(2)m. Expected market balance requires 2 + (1 − σv(2)m) + 2(1 − σvM ) =
2 + σv(2)m + σvM , or 3 = 2σv(2)m + 3σvM , which implies σvM ∈ [1/3, 1]. Given System S2a , it
is cumbersome but not difficult to verify that the strategies assigned to each voter are best
responses to others’ stated strategies and to the price if, conditional on expected market
balance, p, σv(2)m , and σvM satisfy:
p = v(2)m
(
1− σvM
6 + 3σvM
)
p = vM
(
2 + σv(2)m
10− σv(2)m
)
and vM ∈ [(1/14), v(2)m, (2/7)v(2)m].
To conclude the proof, we thus need to show that when voters preferences are not known
ex ante, the equilibrium is fully revealing. We proceed in steps. Consider first vm. The
question is whether in equilibrium vm can identify that the other m member must be the
individual randomizing between D1 and S. The possible alternative scenarios are described
in Table A1. The first row identifies the group of the individual whose perspective we are
taking, and the constraint that expected market balance imposes on his strategy.
The lower bound on acceptable vM values is not necessary: the equilibrium exists for all vM ≤ (2/7)v(2)m.
A corresponding restriction however is required when g′ = M . We impose it in this case too to maintain
the symmetry of the notation in the lemma. As discussed at the end of the proof, there are ranges of value
realizations for which multiple equilibria exist.
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Cases: 1 2 3
D2 m m m
D2/S m M M
D1/S M M m
S M m M
S M M M
Table A 1: Cases to consider, v¯m
Case 1 cannot be an equilibrium: for any p , vm would gain by deviating from D2 to D1,
violating expected market balance. Case 2 cannot be a fully revealing equilibrium either:
consider the M member with assigned strategy D1/S; expected market balance requires the
voter assigned strategy D2/S to sell with some probability σ ≥ 1/3–the probability labelled
σvM–but for any σ ≥ 1/3 in a fully revealing equilibrium there exists no value v such that
the M member with assigned strategy D1/S could be indifferent between D1 and S and
prefer D1 to D2. Thus if a fully revealing equilibrium exists, preferences and strategies must
be described by Case 3: the other m member must be the individual randomizing between
D1 and S.
Consider now the problem from the perspective of v(2)m. Again the question is whether
he can identify that the other m member must be the individual demanding two votes.
Expected market balance constrains v(2)m to sell his vote with positive probability, and to
demand votes with positive probability. We indicate this constraint by the notation D/S,
because it could be satisfied by randomizing over the full set of possible actions, as long as
positive probability is assigned to selling and to demanding. The possible cases are described
in Table A2.
Cases: 1 2 3
D/S m m m
D2/S m M M
D2 M M m
S M m M
S M M M
Table A 2: Cases to consider, v(2)m
It is not difficult to verify that under both Case 1 and Case 2, for any σvM ≥ 1/3, v(2)m’s
unique best response is D2. But D2 would violate expected budget balance. Hence in
equilibrium the only possible case is 3: it must be that the other m member is demanding
two votes.
Finally, we need to establish that all majority members, vM and the two members labelled
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viM , in equilibrium assign the correct corresponding strategies to the two minority members.
Consider first individual vM , who in equilibrium is assigned strategy D2/S. The relevant
cases are in Table A3
Cases: 1 2 3 4
D/S M M M M
S m m m M
S m M M M
D2 M m M m
D1/S M M m m
Table A 3: Cases to consider, v¯M
Case 1 is ruled out because there can be no fully revealing equilibrium where both mi-
nority members sell with probability one. In Case 2, D2 always dominates D1 for vM .
If σv(2)m > 1/2 (recall that σv(2)m is the selling probability of the individual with strategy
D1/S), then for vM , S strictly dominates not entering the market. Hence if σv(2)m > 1/2,
vM must play strategy D2/S. But expected market balance then constrains σvM > 1/3, in
which case strategy D1/S cannot be a best response for an M member because for any value
v both D1 and S are dominated by D2. If σv(2)m < 1/2, then for vM , not entering the market
dominates S. But then vM ’s expected demand must be positive, and with σv(2)m < 1/2, ex-
pected market balance is violated. Hence Case 2 is excluded. In Case 3, it can be verified
easily that S is vM ’s best response to the others’ strategies; but for all σv(2)m > 0 selling with
probability one violates expected market balance. Hence Case 3 can be excluded too. The
relevant scenario must be Case 4.
Consider now majority member viM , who is constrained by expected market balance to
sell his vote. The possible scenarios are described in Table A4 below:
Cases: 1 2 3 4 5 6
S M M M M M M
D2 m m M M M m
D2/S m M M m m M
D1/S M M m m M m
S M m m M m M
Table A 4: Cases to consider, viM
Taking into account the constraints on the randomization probabilities, the arguments
described above exclude Case 1 (because the m voter assigned strategy D2 would have a
If σv(2)m = 1/2, D2 is vM best response, which again violates market balance.
If σv(2)m = 0 and vM sells with probability one, expected market balance is satisfied but v(2)m’s strategy
is clearly suboptimal: EUv(2)mD1 = −p, dominated for example by not entering the market.
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profitable deviation to D1), Case 2 (because the M voter assigned strategy D1/S would
have a profitable deviation to D2), and Cases 3 and 4 (because in both the m voter assigned
strategy D1/S would have a profitable deviation to D2). From the perspective of majority
member viM , Cases 5 and 6 cannot be distinguished. But the distinction is irrelevant: viM ’s
unique best response is S in both scenarios.
(2). If g′ = M , each voter’s preferred alternative is known, and each voter expects the
others to follow the strategies described in the lemma, the expected utilities of different
actions are given by:
EUvMD2 = σv(2)M [σvm(vM − 2p) + (1− σvm)(vM/2− p)]+
+ (1− σv(2)M )[σvm(vM − 2p) + 2(1− σvm)(vM − p)/3]
EUvMD1 = σv(2)M [σvm(vM − p) + (1− σvm)(−p)]+
+ (1− σv(2)M )[σvm(vM − p) + 2(1− σvm)(vM − p)/3]
EUvM0 = σvmvM + (1− σvm)(1− σv(2)M )vM/2
EUvMS = σv(2)M [σvmvM + (1− σvm)p/2]+
+ (1− σv(2)M )[σvm(vM + p/4) + (1− σvm)p]
EUv(2)MD2 = σvm(v(2)M − p) + (1− σvm)(2v(2)M − 2p)/3
EUv(2)MD1 = σvm(v(2)M − p) + (1− σvm)(2v(2)M − p)/3
EUv(2)M0 = σvmv(2)M + (1− σvm)v(2)M/2
EUv(2)MS = σvm(v(2)M + p/2) + (1− σvm)(v(2)M/2 + 2p/3)
EUvmD2 = σv(2)M (vvm/2− p) + (1− σv(2)M )(vvm/3− 2p/3)
EUvmD1 = σv(2)M (−p) + (1− σv(2)M )(−2p/3) (S2b)
EUvm0 = 0
EUvmS = σv(2)M (p/2) + (1− σv(2)M )p
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EUvMD2 = σv(2)M [σvm(vM − p) + (1− σvm)2(vM − p)/3+
+ (1− σv(2)M )[σvm(vM − 2p/3) + (1− σvm)vM ]
EUvMD1 = σvm [σv(2)M (vM − p) + (1− σv(2)M )(vM − 2p/3)]+
+ (1− σvm)[σv(2)M (2vM − p)/3 + (1− σv(2)M )(vM − p/2)]
EUvM0 = σvmvM + (1− σvm)[(1− σv(2)M )vM + σv(2)MvM/2]
EUvMS = σvm [σv(2)M (vM + p/2) + (1− σv(2)M )(vM + p)]+
+ (1− σvm)[σv(2)M (vM/2 + 2p/3) + (1− σv(2)M )(2vM/3 + 5p/6)]
EUvimD2 = σv(2)M [σvm(vim/2− p) + 2(1− σvm)(vim − p)/3] + (1− σv(2)M )σvm(vim − 2p)/3
EUvimD1 = σv(2)M [σvm(−p) + (1− σvm)(2vim − p)/3]+
+ (1− σv(2)M )[σvm(−2p/3) + (1− σvm)(vim − p)/2]
EUvim0 = σv(2)M (1− σvm)vim/2
EUvimS = σv(2)M [σvmp/2 + (1− σvm)(vim/2 + 2p/3)]+
+ (1− σv(2)M )[σvmp+ (1− σvm)(vim/3 + 5p/6)]
Exactly as in (1) above, if voters’ preferences are known, the strategies and price in the lemma
can be shown to be an equilibrium by verifying that expected market balance is satisfied and
no profitable deviation exists for any voter, given System (S2b). The logical arguments
followed in (1) can also be used here to show that the equilibrium is fully revealing. Recall
that expected market balance imposes σvm ∈ [1/3, 1].Consider first voter vM , constrained
by expected market balance to strategy D2. From his perspective, the possible cases are
depicted in Table A5
Cases: 1 2 3 4
D2 M M M M
D2/S m m M M
D1/S m M m M
S M m m m
S M M M m
Table A 5: Cases to consider, v¯M
Case 4 is excluded because in equilibrium both minority members cannot be selling with
To prevent deviation by vM , there is a necessary constraint on the lower bound of vm: vm ≥
592/(3(1381 + 51
√
817))v(2)M , or vm ≥ 0.0695v(2)M , satisfied by vm ≥ (1/14)v(2)M . The condition is
required because at low enough vm/v(2)M , σvm approaches 1, and σv(2)M approaches 0, and thus vM can
profitable deviate to demanding a single vote. The profitable deviation only exists because vM is a majority
voter.
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probability one. Case 1 and Case 3 are identical to Case 4 and Case 3 in Table A4 above,
and can be excluded through the same arguments. Hence the correct scenario must be Case
2.
Consider then voter v(2)M , who in equilibrium must, by market balance, demand votes
with some positive probability. Table A6 reports the possible cases, from his perspective:
Cases: 1 2 3 4
D/S M M M M
D2/S m m M M
D2 m M m M
S M m m m
S M M M m
Table A 6: Cases to consider, v(2)M
Case 4 is excluded because there cannot be an ex ante equilibrium with trade in which
both m members sell with probability one. Cases 1 and 2 can also be excluded because for
all σvm ∈ [1/3, 1], p must be such that voter v(2)M would have a profitable deviation to D2,
violating expected market balance. Hence the correct scenario is Case 2. From the point of
view of voter viM ≤ v(2)M , with equilibrium strategy S, the possible cases are represented
in Table A4 above. As argued there, all scenarios can be excluded but Case 6 (the true
state when g′ = m) and Case 5 (the true state here). But the inability to distinguish the
two scenarios is irrelevant: in both cases, the unique best response for viM is S. Finally,
for each of the two m members, the strategy of the other can be identified easily. From
the point of view of vm, with equilibrium strategy D2/S, the other m member cannot play
either strategy D2 (because vm’s best response would then be S, violating expected market
balance), or strategy D1/S (because for any σv(2)M > 0, vm’s best response would then be
D2, again violating expected market balance); hence he must be playing strategy S. From
the point of view of vim ≤ vm, with equilibrium strategy S, the other m member cannot play
strategy S (because none of the M voters would then be buying with positive probability),
or D2 (because the M voter with assigned strategy D1/S would have a profitable deviation
to D2), or D1/S (because, again as argued earlier, the m voter with assigned strategy D1/S
would have a profitable deviation to D2); hence he must be playing strategy D2/S.
Lemma 3. If vg ≤ (1/14)v(2)g′, then for all realizations of {v1, .., v5} such that vm ≥ vM
there exists a fully revealing ex ante equilibrium such that voters vg′ and v(2)g′ demand
one vote, vg randomizes between demanding two votes and selling his vote (with probability
σvg = 2/3), and all other voters offer to sell their vote. The equilibrium price is vg/4.
Proof of Lemma 3.Again, we need to distinguish the two cases: g′ = m, and g′ = M .
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(1) If g′ = m, each voter’s preferred alternative is known, and each expects the others to
follow the strategies described in the lemma, the expected utilities of different actions are
given by:
EUvjmD2 = σvM (vjm − 2p) + (1− σvM )2(vjm − p)/3
EUvjmD1 = σvM (vjm − p) + (1− σvM )2(vjm − p)/3
EUvjm0 = σvMvjm + (1− σvM )vjm/2
EUvjmS = σvM (3vjm/4 + p/4) + (1− σvM )p
EUvMB2 = (vM − 2p)/3
EUvMB1 = −2p/3
EUvM0 = 0
EUvMS = 2p/3
EUviMB2 = σvM (viM/3− 2p/3)
EUviMB1 = σvM2(−p)/3 + (1− σvM )(viM/3− p/3)
EUviM0 = 0
EUviMS = σvM (2p/3) + (1− σvM )(viM/3 + p)
where vjm = vm, v(2)m, and viM ≤ vM . Expected market balance requires 2+σvM = 2+2(1−
σvM ), or σvM = 2/3, and vM is indifferent between demanding two votes and offering to sell
his vote if p = vM/4. It can then be verified immediately that if vM < v(2)m/4 the strategies
in the lemma are an equilibrium; thus they are an equilibrium if vM < (1/14)v(2)m. We then
need to verify that the equilibrium is fully revealing.
Consider first the perspective of minority voter vjm = vm, v(2)m, constrained by expected
market equilibrium to demand one vote. The possible scenarios are in Table A7.
Cases: 1 2 3
D1 m m m
D1 M M m
D2/S M m M
S m M M
S M M M
Table A 7: Cases to consider, vjm = vm, v(2)m
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In both Case 1 and Case 2, the voter assigned strategy D2/S could deviate to 0, satisfying
expected market balance and increasing his expected utility; thus the equilibrium must be
Case 3. Consider now majority voter vM . The two voters offering their vote for sale cannot
both be minority voters. Hence one majority voter must have strategy S. If the other
majority voter had strategy D1, then vM ’s best response would be to do nothing; this would
satisfy expected market balance but would mean that the voter assigned strategy D1, a
minority member, would be playing a strategy that cannot be a best response–for example
it would be clearly dominated by doing nothing. Hence the assigned strategies could not be
an equilibrium. Thus, from the perspective of voter vM , both voters who offer their vote for
sale must be majority members, and both voters demanding one vote must be minorities.
Finally, consider majority voter viM , constrained by expected market balance to selling
his vote. From his perspective, the possible cases are as in Table A8.
Cases: 1 2 3 4 5 6
S M M M M M M
D1 m m m m m M
D1 m M M M M M
D2/S M m M m M m
S M M m M m m
Table A 8: Cases to consider, viM ,
But in Cases 2, 3, 4, and 5, the voter assigned strategy D2/S would have a profitable
deviation to 0, compatible with expected market equilibrium; hence those cases are excluded.
Cases 1 and 6 cannot be distinguished, but the distinction is irrelevant: viM ’s unique best
response is S in both scenarios.
(2). If g′ = M , each voter’s preferred alternative is known, and each voter expects the
others to follow the strategies described in the lemma, the expected utilities of different
actions are given by:
EUvjMD2 = σvm(vjM − 2p) + (1− σvm)2(vjM − p)/3
EUvjMD1 = σvm(vjM − p) + (1− σvm)2(vjM − p)/3
EUvjM0 = σvmvjM + (1− σvm)vjM/2
EUvjMS = σvm(vjM + p/4) + (1− σvm)p
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EUvmD2 = (vm − 2p)/3
EUvmD1 = 2(−p)/3
EUvm0 = 0
EUvmS = 2p/3
EUvimD2 = σvm(vim/3− 2p/3)
EUvimD1 = σvm(−2p/3) + (1− σvm)(vim/3− p/3)
EUvim0 = 0
EUvimS = σvm(2p/3) + (1− σvm)(vim/3 + p)
EUvMD2 = σvm(vM − 2p/3) + (1− σvm)vM
EUvMD1 = σvm(vM − 2p/3) + (1− σvm)(vM − p/3)
EUvM0 = vM
EUvMS = σvm(vM + 2p/3) + (1− σvm)(2vM/3 + p)
where vjM = vM , v(2)M ; vim ≤ vm ≤ v(2)M , and vM ≤ vim. As in (1) above, expected
market balance requires 2 + σvm = 2 + 2(1 − σvm), or σvm = 2/3, and vm is indifferent
between demanding two votes and offering to sell his vote if p = vm/4. For the value
realizations considered here, when g′ = M , vM ’s best response is selling as long as vM <
7/4vm, a condition guaranteed by vM ≤ vm. It can then be verified immediately that if
vm ≤ v(2)M/4 the strategies in the lemma are an equilibrium; thus they are an equilibrium
if vm ≤ (1/14)v(2)M .
We then need to verify that the equilibrium is fully revealing. Consider first the per-
spective of voter vjM , assigned strategy D1 by expected market balance. At least one of the
voters selling with probability one must belong to M . But if the other M member played
either strategy D2/S or strategy S, then, since p < vjM/4, voter vjM would gain from devi-
ating to D2, violating expected market balance. Hence the other M member must be playing
strategy D1; and thus the two m members must be playing strategies D2/S and S. Consider
then voter vm, who, by expected market balance must be demanding a positive number of
votes with positive probability. If the other m member played strategy D1, at p < vm, vm’s
best response would be doing nothing, which would satisfy expected market balance. But if
a fully revealing ex ante equilibrium exists it cannot have vm staying out of the market and
the other voters playing the strategies conjectured here: the M voter playing D1 would be
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sure to buy a vote and lose the election, a strategy that cannot be a best response for any
positive p. Hence the other m voter must be selling, and voter vm can deduce the direction
of preferences of all other voters. Consider then voter vim ≤ vm, who must sell to satisfy
expected market balance. From his perspective, the other m voter cannot be selling. If he
played D1, an M voter would have strategy D2/S, but would then gain by staying out of
the market. Hence the other m voter must be playing strategy D2/S. Finally consider voter
vM , assigned strategy S by expected market balance. The possible scenarios are in Table
A8 above, and as argued earlier, the only possibilities are Cases 1 and 6. These two cases
cannot be distinguished, but the distinction is irrelevant: vM ’s unique best response is S in
both scenarios. We have thus shown that the equilibrium is fully revealing.
By proving Lemma 1, 2 and 3, we have shown that a fully revealing ex-ante equilibrium
exists. The proposition is proven. Note that as the proofs of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 make
clear, for vg ∈ [0.0695v(2)g′ , (1/4)v(2)g′ ], both the equilibrium described in Lemma 2 and the
equilibrium described in Lemma 3 exist.
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